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NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN AIR
CRASH CASES: A NEW FLIGHT PATH?
This Recent Development discusses the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress' as applied to domestic2 air crash cases. It focuses
primarily on Illinois law,3 which has approached negligent infliction of
emotional distress conflicts in a variety of ways. Special attention is paid
to the most recent Illinois approach to the issue, as expressed in Corgan
v. Muehling.4 This Recent Development concludes with a discussion of
the probable impact that Corgan will have on air crash litigation
strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Major air accidents startle and worry the American public. Airline
crashes often result in mass catastrophe, ending hundreds of lives in a
flash. However, because air travel is one of the most common forms of
transportation for Americans,5 accidents are inevitable.6 Modem tech-
1. This Recent Development does not address intentional infliction of emotional distress
("IIED"). For a general discussion of IIED, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (5th ed. 1984).
2. This Recent Development is limited to negligent infliction of emotional distress actions in
domestic air crash cases; it does not discuss the law governing international air travel, including the
Warsaw Convention. For a discussion of negligent infliction of emotional distress under interna-
tional aviation law, see Gregory C. Read, Recovery for Emotional Distress in Aviation Cases, Litiga-
tion in Aviation 1, 3-11 (1991).
3. Although this Recent Development centers around Illinois law, the law of other jurisdic-
tions is discussed as well. However, this Recent Development does not offer an extensive jurisdic-
tional survey of the status of the law on negligent infliction of emotional distress. For an in-depth
analysis of the law on this subject, see Douglas B. Marlowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental
Distresr A Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of
Objective versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REv. 781 (1988) [hereinafter Comment].
4. 574 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1991). Because many cases which arose out of the air crash disaster at
Sioux City, Iowa, are pending in Chicago, the status of Illinois law is important. Corgan will affect
all of these cases applying Illinois law.
5. In 1988, approximately 456,026,400 commercial passengers flew from America's 30 busiest
airports. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 622 (110th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter Statistical Abstract]. American Airlines alone flew 64.7 billion passenger miles in 1988.
William Garvey, Interview: Robert Crandall, FLYING, June 1989, at 86, 86.
6. In 1988, for example, one air crash fatality occurred for every billion flight miles. Statistical
Abstract, supra note 5, at 622. The 1988 fatal accident rate was 0.026 fatal accidents per hundred
thousand departures, roughly one fatal accident per every four million flights. NATIONAL TRANSP.
SAFETY BD., ANNUAL REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA: U.S. AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS
CALENDAR YEAR 1988, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter NTSB Report]. The overall accident rate was 0.367,
approximately one accident every three million flights. Id.
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nological innovations minimize the potential for air mishaps.7 Unfortu-
nately, though, the number of flights is increasing while the accident rate
remains constant.' Thus, the frequency of air crashes will probably con-
tinue to escalate.9 One source predicts that by 2005 a major air crash
will occur every two weeks. 10
Commercial air crashes often spawn exceptionally complex litiga-
tion, 1 putting aviation law on the cutting edge in the areas of torts, prod-
ucts liability, and civil procedure.1 2 For instance, creative plaintiffs'
attorneys seeking a means to recover for crash victims' mental anguish
often sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 13 In essence, a
plaintiff asserting a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim will
attempt to prove that the negligence of one or more of the defendants
7. For example, the Air Traflic Control system uses radar to separate air traffic. Department
of Transp., AIM '92: Airman's Information Manual 94 (Aviation Supplies & Academics, Inc. ed.,
1992) [hereinafter AIM 1992]. Additionally, navigational systems, such as the Instrument Landing
System (ILS) allow safe approaches in inclement weather. PETER DOGAN, THE INSTRUMENT
FLIGHT TRAINING MANUAL, 167-68 (2d ed. 1991). "To the uninitiated, [ILS] accuracy seems al.
most supernatural." Id. at 168. However, technology cannot master the weather and the hazards it
poses to flight. "'[You cannot count on the weather, because even with computers, satellites, and
perhaps a little witchcraft, man simply cannot outguess it 100 percent of the time." ROBERT N.
BUCK, WEATHER FLYING 2 (1988).
8. The air transportation business grew tremendously in the 1980s. From 1980 to 1988, the
number of air passengers grew 53.6%. Statistical Abstract, supra note 5, at 622. Similarly, the
number of commercial aircraft in operation grew from 2360 in 1983 to 3190 in 1989. Id. at 624.
From 1984 to 1988, departures rose from 5,898,852 to 7,622,365. NTSB Report, supra note 6, at 3.
In 1988 (the last year for which accident statistics are available), the accident rate declined slightly.
Id. at 2. However, the accident rate had previously increased from 0.288 accidents per departure in
1984 to 0.367 in 1988. Id. at 3. The flight hour and flight mile accident rates also increased, Id.
9. Growth is expected to continue because an increase in air travel results in an increased
potential for air crashes. If the statistics continue at this pace, Americans will witness more air
accidents. See supra note 8.
10. Gary Stix, Along for the Ride?, Sci. AM., July 1991, at 94.
11. Almost every passenger aboard a crashed aircraft commences litigation. In addition,
spouses of passengers often bring parasitic consortium claims. Interview with Richard Walker, As-
sociate at Adler, Kaplan & Begy (June 1991) [hereinafter Walker Interview]. In large multi-district
litigation (MDL) actions, coordination between the numerous plaintiffs, defendants, and courts
stretches litigation to mammoth proportions. Id.
12. Aviation cases often involve other legal areas as well, including breach of warranty. See,
e.g., Rauch v. United Instr., Inc., 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Air Crash Disaster at Metro.
Airport, Detroit, Mich. on Jan. 19, 1979, 619 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (addressing breach of
warranty arising out of an air crash).
13. See, eg., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 507 F. Supp. 21, 22
(N.D. 111. 1980) (plaintiff sued air carrier and aircraft manufacturer for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress stemming from her daughter's death in crash). Products liability and breach of war-
ranty issues are beyond the scope of this Recent Development, which focuses on actions against air
carriers, instead of manufacturers or service outfits.
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EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN AIR CRASHES
approximately caused him to suffer mental anguish. 14 Airline crashes are
ripe with potential negligent infliction of emotional distress actions, in-
cluding "pre-impact fear" claims. Simply, "pre-impact fear" is defined
as the emotional distress an airline passenger experiences while awaiting
an emergency landing.15
II. THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING NEGLIGENT INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The development of rules governing negligent infliction of emotional
distress has been far from fluid. Often contradictory rules coexist in a
convoluted state.16 Before reviewing the negligent infliction of emotional
distress principles, however, it is helpful to distinguish the two basic
types of emotional distress plaintiffs: direct victims and bystanders. Di-
rect victims, the primary recipients of a tort's manifestations, are directly
involved with the basic tort from which all potential liability arises.1 7
For example, passengers aboard a crashed aircraft are direct victims.1 '
Bystanders,19 on the other hand, are secondary plaintiffs who allege emo-
tional distress claims based on witnessing torts to direct victims. 20
Direct victim cases and bystander cases should be considered sepa-
rately, even if they arise out of the same incident. The legal rules gov-
erning the two types of cases often differ.2 In addition, the fundamental
distinction between direct victims and bystanders necessitates separate
consideration of the cases.22 If one legal rule governs both direct victims
and bystanders, it is more appropriate to recognize that both groups co-
incidentally share the same rule, rather than believe that one rule neces-
14. For a general discussion of negligent infliction of emotional distress, see KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 54.
15. See infra notes 102-17 for a discussion of "pre-impacet" fear.
16. See Comment, supra note 3 (discussing rules adopted by the various jurisdictions).
17. See, eg., Chicago Air Crash, 507 F. Supp. at 23 (allowing recovery for claims based on
bodily injury). See Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1066 n.12 (D.C. App. 1990); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 365-66 (discussing the difference between direct victims and bystanders).
18. Chicago Air Crash, 507 F. Supp. at 21.
19. "Bystander" is defined as "[o]ne who stands near; a chance looker-on... [o]ne present but
not taking part, looker-on, spectator, beholder, observer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 201 (6th ed.
1990).
20. See, eg., Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1983). See also Claudia J.
Wrazel, Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The "Bystander
Recovery Cases," 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (1981).
21. See, e.g., Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ill. 1991) (stating that different rules
apply to direct victim and bystander cases).
22. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
1992]
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sarily controls both groups.23
A. The "Physical Impact" Rule and the "Physical Manifestation"
Requirement
The "Physical Impact" rule states that negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress is a conditional tort. It exists only in the presence of bod-
ily contact sufficient to yield a separate and self-sustaining claim.24
Traditionally, courts held that negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims were "parasitic" to other recognized torts. 25 Many courts con-
tinue to hold that, standing alone, injuries resulting from only fear are
not compensable, even if the plaintiff's fear manifested in a diagnosed
mental or physical infirmity.26  Courts refuse to recognize pure fear-in-
duced injuries because they do not have a separate and self-sustaining
tort to which to cling.27 Given a separate tort, however, the fear-induced
claim shares a partner, and the separate tort drags its fear-induced coun-
terpart into the realm of compensability.28
Courts and commentators state several reasons for denying pure fear-
induced injury claims, including: (1) people do not owe others a duty of
23. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
24. Comment, supra note 3, at 783; Read, supra note 2, at 11-12; KEETON ET AL., supra note
1, at 361.
25. Comment, supra note 3, at 782 & n.7, 783 & n.8. "Parasitic" means "arising from the
violation of another independently recognized protected interest." Id. at 782-83. With the passage
of time, some parasitic claims become self-sustaining claims. Id. at 782 n.7.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts illustrates the parasitic nature of the negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim. "If the actor's negligent conduct has so caused any bodily harm to another
as to make him liable for it, the actor is also subject to liability for... [accompanying emotional
distress]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 456 (1965) (emphasis added). While the Restate-
ment is helpful, its many rules regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress may create confu-
sion. The Restatement fails to define clear, succinct rules for direct victims and bystanders. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT §§ 313, 436, 436A, 456 (1965).
26. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 361. "Where the defendant's negligence causes only
mental disturbance, without accompanying physical injury, illness or other physical consequences,
and in the absence of some other independent basis for tort liability, the great majority of courts still
hold that in the ordinary case there can be no recovery." Id. (footnotes omitted). See Comment,
supra note 3, at 792 & n.59 (listing jurisdictions adhering to the Physical Impact rule). See also
Read, supra note 2, at 11-12.
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note I, at 361.
28. One of the most prominent cases to establish the Physical Impact rule was Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry. Co. 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896); Comment, supra note 3, at 783. In Mitchell, a negli-
gently driven carriage nearly struck a pregnant woman, causing her great anxiety and an eventual
miscarriage. 45 N.E. at 354. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to state a
compensable claim because fear alone cannot yield compensable injuries; for recovery, the injuries
must accompany a contemporaneous physical injury. Id. at 355.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/9
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protection against fear;2 9 (2) even if such a duty existed, fear-induced
injuries exceed the boundaries of proximate cause; 30 (3) allowing fear-
induced claims invites a flood of litigation that would burden the judici-
ary;3 (4) such a cause of action could elicit fraudulent claims;32 (5) negli-
gent defendants, as opposed to intentional tortfeasors, are not culpable
enough to be held liable for purely mental harm;3 and (6) the harm to
plaintiffs is commonly temporary and relatively minor.3 4
In the 1898 case of Braun v. Craven, the Supreme Court of Illinois
adopted the Physical Impact rule.35 In Braun, the defendant landlord
entered his tenant's residence to collect rent.36 The landlord's abusive
29. Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., which held that a defendant owes a plaintiff
no duty to protect her from fright, illustrates the rationale followed by early courts. 23 A. 340, 340
(Pa. 1892). Today the Ewing view is obsolete, at least in the direct victim context.
30. Id. The court in Ewing noted a lack of proximate cause:
[The defendant had no] reason to anticipate that the result of a collision on its road would
so operate on the mind of a person who witnessed it, but who sustained no bodily injury
thereby, as to produce such nervous excitement and distress as to result in permanent
injury ... if the injury was one not likely to result from the collision, and one which the
company could not have reasonably foreseen, then the accident was not the proximate
cause.... [we regard the injury as too remote.
Id. See also Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 355 (noting that injuries from distress alone exceed proximate
cause boundaries).
31. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 360 (citing Mitchell, 45 N.E. 354). The Ewing court
stated: "If mere fright, unaccompanied with bodily injury, is a cause of action, the scope of what are
known as 'accident cases' will be very greatly enlarged." 23 A. at 340. See also Wrazel, supra note
20, at 847.
32. See, eg., Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354-55 ("If the right of recovery in this class of cases should
be once established, it would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury com-
plained of may be easily feigned without detection .... "). See also KEETON ET AL, supra note 1, at
361; Comment, supra, note 3, at 789; Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Recovery for Psychic
Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 351-53 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b
(1965).
33. Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 608 (I1. 1991) (rejecting the contention). See gener-
ally KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 361; infra note 34; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 436A cmt. b (1965).
34. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 360-61. Prosser and Keeton summarize the policy consid-
erations for denying recovery:
The temporary emotion of fright, so far from serious that it does no physical harm, is so
evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and usually so trivial, that the courts have been
quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff against mere negligence, where the elements of ex-
treme outrage and moral blame which have had such weight in the intentional tort context
are lacking.
Id. at 361. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965); Williams v. Baker,
572 A.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990).
35. 51 N.E. 657, 664 (11. 1898).
36. Id. at 657-58.
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language and gestures startled the tenant.3 7 After developing a nervous
condition, the tenant sued the landlord for her trauma-induced injuries.38
The Illinois Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot sustain a negli-
gence39 action for personal injuries absent a showing of bodily contact.40
The court explained that the plaintiff must show that she incurred physi-
cal contact, not merely fright.41
The court in Braun employed a proximate cause rationale, concluding
that plaintiffs cannot reasonably foresee the consequences of the defend-
ant's negligently frightful behavior. The court refused to extend liability
to defendants for injuries to peculiarly sensitive plaintiffs.42 According to
the court, allowing an action unsupported by physical contact would
present the potential for "dangerous use,"' 43 and impose liability on de-
fendants for unforeseeable injuries."
Illinois continued to apply the Physical Impact rule into the 1980s. 41
In addition to Illinois, other jurisdictions46 still adhere to it. Although
the Physical Impact rule is a bright-line rule,47 it is criticized as too harsh
because it denies recovery to seriously injured plaintiffs who "luckily"
avoid physical contact.48  Consequently, the rule does not contemplate
37. Id
38. Id. at 659.
39. Limiting its discussion to the negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court did not
consider intentional infliction of emotional distress. Braun, 51 N.E. at 664.
40. Id at 664.
41. Id
42. Id.
43. Id Presumably, "dangerous use" refers to the potential for feigned and trivial claims, and
suggests concern for open-ended liability.
44. Id
45. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 480 N.E.2d 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 507 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (applying
Illinois law); Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 380 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (applying
Physical Impact requirement). But see Hammond v. Lane, 515 N.E.2d 828 (IlM. App. Ct. 1987)
(applying the Zone of Danger test).
46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 361. See Comment, supra note 3, at 792 n.59 (listing
jurisdictions which still adhere to the Physical Impact rule). Indiana has recently modified its Physi-
cal Impact rule, holding that distress need not result from physical injury accompanying impact.
Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind. 1991).
47. The rule also preserves judicial resources and limits the potential for trivial and fraudulent
claims. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
48. See James J. Reidy, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Illinois: Living in the Past,
Suffering in the Present, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 295, 296 (1981) (".... [T]he physical impact rule is at
variance with modern needs and concepts of justice"). See also Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 937 F.2d
1004, 1009 (5th Cir. 1991) ("This rule has been criticized ... as being arbitrarily under inclusive for
there are genuine mental injuries that are not accompanied by a physical impact or injury.").
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/9
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bystander recovery rendering many seriously injured people without a
source of compensation.49
Due to the harshness of the Physical Impact rule, many courts have
mitigated the bright-line limitation.50 Specifically, courts commonly find
that even the most minimal bodily contact constitutes physical impact.5 1
Many courts do not address whether the physical contact supports a sep-
arate cause of action, but rather whether a physical contact exists to sup-
port the physical impact requirement of the rule.5 2 In this context,
negligent infliction of emotional distress is not a parasitic cause of action.
Instead, it is a self-sustaining action with a bodily impact requirement.5 3
In Braun, the court did not address the issue of whether, upon demon-
strating a requisite physical impact, any level of emotional distress may
support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, or whether
a threshold exists.54 In 1990, in Allen v. Otis Elevator Co. , the Illinois
Court of Appeals attached a "physical manifestation" requirement56 to
49. Apparently, by definition, bystanders cannot recover under the Physical Impact rule be-
cause they do not incur bodily contact. See supra notes 19-20.
50. Comment, supra note 3, at 792-94.
51. In Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1983), the Supreme Court of
Illinois explained:
A significant reason for [the Physical Impact rule's] loss of adherents was that courts
quickly began to find that the impact requirement had been met through minor physical
contacts which in reality were insignificant and played trivial or no part in causing harm to
the plaintiff. The requirement of impact' often became purely formal, and it was satisfied
by a slight jolt or jar... or 'any degree of physical impact, however slight.'
Id. (quoting Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. 1961)). See also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 1, at 363 ("[C]ourts have found 'impact' in minor contacts with the [plaintiff] which often play
no part in causing the real harm, and in themselves can have no importance whatever.") (footnotes
omitted); Comment, supra note 3, at 791-94.
52. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 363-64.
53. Prosser and Keeton discuss courts that allow recovery when: (1) bodily contact exists; or
(2) another independent tort supports the general claim. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 361. In
this context, bodily contact can either: (1) yield a negligent infliction claim via a separate cause of
action, making negligent infliction a parasitic action; or (2) exist as a simple limitation on the claim,
just as harmful or offensive contact limits the battery claim. Id. at 364 ("[The great majority of
courts have now repudiated the requirement of 'impact,' regarding as sufficient the requirement that
the mental distress be certified by some physical injury, illness or other objective physical manifesta-
tion."). Under this interpretation, the Physical Impact rule does not limit negligent infliction of
emotional distress to parasitic claims.
54. See Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657 (Ill. 1898); Allen v. Otis Elevator Co., 563 N.E.2d 826,
831 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). Further, the court in Otis Elevator noted that the Illinois courts have not
squarely confronted the issue. Id. at 831-32.
55. Otis Elevator, 563 N.E.2d at 831.
56. Comment, supra note 3, at 795. The physical manifestation requirement has the greatest
impact when applied to the Zone of Danger test, discussed infra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
942 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 70:935
the Physical Impact rule. In Otis Elevator, the court held that Braun
requires plaintiffs to show physical injury resulting from the defendant's
negligence.51 If the Physical Impact rule is not trivialized, an accompa-
nying physical manifestation requirement is redundant because every
"real" bodily impact produces some kind of physical injury.5 8 However,
as a result of the modem tendency to minimize the effect of the physical
impact component, 9 the physical manifestation requirement has become
more important. Indeed, the manifestation requirement appears to limit
relatively trivial actions arising from minimal "impact."'
The physical manifestation requirement limits the negligent defend-
ants' liability largely through its evidentiary function. To satisfy the re-
quirement, the plaintiff must present the fact-finders with objective
physical manifestation evidence from which to conclude that the plaintiff
actually suffered severe emotional trauma.6" Plaintiffs who cannot meet
the evidentiary standard are barred from recovery.62 The physical mani-
festation requirement has been criticized as both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive.63 In addition, some cases suggest that the requirement
57. Otis Elevator, 563 N.E.2d at 831. The court held that the Physical Impact rule was still
valid under Illinois law. However, the plaintiff's physical injury need not result from bodily contact;
rather, it may arise from negligently inflicted fear. Id. at 832.
58. Prosser and Keeton note that the physical contact component of the Physical Impact rule
arose from the physical manifestation requirement, suggesting that impact shows physical manifesta-
tion. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 363. Under this interpretation, impact and manifestations
overlap, and provide an explanation why the Braun court did not address the issue.
59. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
60. Prosser & Keeton state that the trivialization of the impact requirement has generated de-
bate over the parameters of physical manifestations. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 364-65. They
also allude that the physical manifestation requirement takes over where the bodily contact compo-
nent leaves off. Id. Despite this inference, they do not segregate the impact requirement from the
manifestation component. Id. at 361-65. For example, the scholars state that, in most jurisdictions,
the Physical Impact rule is satisfied where "physical injury, illness or other physical [manifesta-
tions]" exist. Id. at 361. Positing a general rule oflaw, Prosser and Keeton state the rule properly if
the Physical Impact rule includes a physical manifestation requirement; they overstate the rule's
parameters if it does not. The "illness or other physical [manifestations]" that Prosser and Keeton
mention certainly refer to phenomena which occur after the plaintiff leaves the accident site, not to
conditions which occur contemporaneously with the tort. A "pure" Physical Impact rule would not
permit recovery for post-trauma developments. As Otis Elevator illustrates, not all courts have defi-
nitely concluded that the rule includes the physical manifestation requirement. Otis Elevator, 563
N.E.2d at 833.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note
1, at 363; Comment, supra note 3, at 795.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965). See also Comment, supra note
3, at 795.
63. Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246, 259 (N.M. 1990) (abrogating the physical manifestation
requirement).
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is unnecessary given modem technology's ability to detect and diagnose
the effects of emotional distress."4
Although its scope remains largely undefined,65 physical manifestation
appears to include any significant injury or disease resulting from terror
or bodily contact occurring contemporaneously with fright.66 It is not
strictly limited to bodily problems, such as vomiting and miscarriages.67
Rather, physical manifestation includes severe psychiatric and behavioral
problems.68 For example, plaintiffs in aviation cases often allege that
they suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).6 9
In the aviation arena, the Physical Impact rule appears to contemplate
recovery for all plaintiffs who suffer emotional injury as a result of "im-
pacting" something during the air transportation process. In some juris-
dictions the rule is limited by the requirement that the plaintiffs suffer a
"physical injury" from their impact or distress.70 While this "physical
64. Id. See also Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Ill. 1991).
65. KEETON ET AL., supra note I, at 363-64. See also Otis Elevator, 563 N.E.2d at 833 (ex-
plaining that several courts have struggled with determining the conditions or symptoms that satisfy
the requisite injury).
66. Without defining the scope of physical manifestations, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436A cmt. c (1965) provides a useful guide to the general principle. See infra note 68.
67. KEETON ET AL, supra note 1, at 363 & n.38.
68. See, eg., Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ill. 1983). The existence of a
"physical manifestation" turns upon the specific facts the court must consider. Generally, however,
fleeting fear-induced physical side effects do not constitute physical manifestations. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. c (1965). "[Transitory, non-recurring physical phenom-
ena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting, and the like, does not make the actor liable
where such phenomena are in themselves inconsequential and do not amount to any substantial
bodily harm." Id.
Some courts require a diagnosable ailment. For example, in Bass v. Nooney Co., the Supreme
Court of Missouri abandoned the Physical Impact rule in favor of a negligence/foreseeability rule
coupled with a physical manifestation requirement. 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
The court held that "... the emotional distress... must be medically diagnosable and must be of
sufficient severity as to be medically significant." Id.
69. Understanding PTSD is a critical element of many aviation negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims. See Read, supra note 2, at 15-18. See Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, 941 F.2d
1404 (10th Cir. 1991); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 764 F.2d
1082 (5th Cir. 1985).
70. Most likely, the discussion surrounding an incident will focus on the aircraft's impact. Still,
passengers aboard an aircraft which experiences impact will almost always incur bodily contact
themselves. Thus, passengers incur physical impact even though the aircraft does the "real" im-
pacting. Aircraft crash will likely throw passengers forward into seats, or tear them from their seats
and throw them against a wall of the cabin. Obviously, these passengers experience "impact." For
example, in Chicago Air Crash, the court implicitly concluded that a passenger experiences impact
when the aircraft in which he is traveling crashes. 507 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (discussing
Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976)).
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impact" includes most plaintiffs in air crashes, mid-air collisions, and
ground collisions, whether it encompasses "hard" landings and aircraft
instability in severe turbulence is open to debate. The modem trend to-
ward lax physical impact requirements71 suggests that courts may well
consider such events to cause "physical impact." However, Otis Eleva-
tor's physical manifestation requirement would presumably eliminate
trivial claims arising when passengers experience slight fright and accom-
panying discomfort.72
B. The Zone of Danger Test
As discussed above, disenchantment with the Physical Impact rule's
limitations on negligent infliction of emotional distress claims has led
some courts to minimize the requisite bodily impact.73 Other courts have
embraced a doctrine, the "Zone of Danger" test, which ignores the phys-
ical impact requirement completely and allows bystander recovery. The
traditional formulation of the Zone of Danger test allows negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress actions when: (1) the defendant's negligence
caused the plaintiff to reasonably fear for his physical safety; (2) the
plaintiff was geographically positioned in the "zone of danger" surround-
ing the site where the defendant's negligence manifested itself; and (3) the
plaintiff developed a physical injury resulting from his fear.74 Interest-
ingly, the third component of the traditional Zone of Danger test is the
"physical manifestation" requirement, the primary limiting device of the
modified Physical Impact rule.75
71. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
72. Examples of absurd claims include: (1) a passenger's allegation that turbulence caused him
to "jump out of his seat and land on his wallet uncomfortably;" or (2) a passenger's claim that
turbulence caused him to fear that the aircraft was maligned until it returned to smooth air 10
minutes later. While allowing such claims is certainly beyond belief, the "pure" Physical Impact
rule, coupled with a judicial trend toward exceptionally liberal construction of the rule, may poten-
tially support the plaintiff's claim. However, the physical manifestation requirement would preclude
the claim because it is doubtful that the plaintiff could show a "physical manifestation" from his
bout with turbulence. Other limiting devices, such as a "severe distress" requirement, could simi-
larly curb the plaintiff's assertions. See, e.g, Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs,,
P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990) (requiring severe distress).
73. See supra note 47-49 and accompanying text.
74. Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709, 714-15 (Del. 1965); Rickey v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(3)
(plaintiff must fear for the direct victim's safety); § 313(2) (plaintiff must fear for his own well-
being); cmt. d (1965). For a discussion of the Zone of Danger test's evolution, see KEEaTON ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 365-66; Reidy, supra note 48, at 304-07.
75. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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In 1983, Illinois abandoned the Physical Impact rule in favor of the
Zone of Danger test in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority.76  The
Supreme Court of Illinois applied the new test only to bystander cases. 7 7
In Rickey, the plaintiff stood next to his brother when an escalator drew
in the brother's clothes, choking him and inducing a coma. 78 The plain-
tiff bystander, who developed severe psychological and behavioral
problems from watching his brother's mutilation, sued to recover for his
injuries.79 The court allowed the claim because the plaintiff was within
the zone of danger, reasonably feared for his physical safety, and devel-
oped physical manifestations of his fear.80 Rejecting the Physical Impact
rule as a "purely formal" test,"1 the court joined the majority of jurisdic-
tions 2 and paved the way for bystander recovery."
While the Zone of Danger test has no application in the direct victim
76. 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983).
77. Id. at 5. Following Rickey, courts were unsure whether to apply the Zone of Danger test to
direct victim cases as well. Allen v. Otis Elevator Co., 563 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(noting confusion on the issue). Compare Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 480 N.E.2d 1227 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (applying the Zone of Danger test to bystander cases only) with Hammond v. Lane,
515 N.E.2d 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (applying the Zone of Danger rule to bystander and direct
victim cases). Resolving the confusion, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Zone of Danger
test applies only to bystander cases. Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 605 (ll. 1991). See infra
notes 118-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Corgan.
78. Rickey, 457 N.E.2d at 2.
79. Id.
80. Id. The plaintiff's nervous and behavioral disorders constituted "physical manifestations"
of his fear. Id. at 2, 5.
81. Id. at 4. Presumably, the term "purely formal" reflects a form-over-substance notion; in
other words, the Physical Impact requirement no longer serves a realistic goal, but rather continues
only out of custom. Criticizing the Physical Impact rule, the court stated: "A significant reason for
its loss of adherents was that courts quickly began to find that the impact requirement had been met
through minor physical contacts which in reality were insignificant and played trivial or no part in
causing harm to the plaintiff." Id
82. Comment, supra note 3, at 794, 796 n.91 (highlighting jurisdictions that apply a combina-
tion of physical manifestation requirement and Zone of Danger test).
83. Rickey, 457 N.E.2d at 4, 5. In contrast to Illinois, some jurisdictions remove the physical
manifestation requirement from the Zone of Danger test. See, eg., Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical
Ctr. Hosp., 429 N.E.2d 789 (N.Y. 1981). See Comment, supra note 3, at 798 n.92 for a discussion of
the jurisdictions following this approach. Under this rule, a plaintiff must only show that: (1) he
reasonably feared for his own physical safety; and (2) he was in the zone of danger.
The rule articulated in Rickey does not limit recovery to a certain group of plaintiffs, such as
blood relatives of the direct victim. Other courts have restricted the group of bystander plaintiffs.
See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (requiring that the bystander be
"closely related" to the direct victim). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(3) (limit-
ing recovery to immediate family members).
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context, especially in aviation cases, 84 it is important in the bystander
context.85 Requiring that a plaintiff be in the "zone of danger" and rea-
sonably fear for bodily safety are ridiculous restrictions when applied to
air crash cases because potential plaintiffs are within the very thing
which may cause them harm, and they most certainly fear injury. Be-
cause the physical manifestation requirement exists in both the Zone of
Danger test and the Physical Impact rule, applying the Zone of Danger
test to direct victim cases simply abrogates the physical impact compo-
nent of the Physical Impact rule, essentially stripping it of its effective-
ness. The bystander cases logically require a geographical limitation to
taper proximate cause problems; however, the direct victim cases do not.
Extending the Zone of Danger test to direct victim cases is akin to "con-
fusing apples for oranges."86
In the aviation context, the Rickey court's "zone-of-physical-danger"
rule87 would allow limited recovery for bystanders. For example, an air-
craft de-icing employee could probably recover if an out-of-control jet
soared above his head. The geographical limitation at the heart of the
rule, however, would preclude witnesses who see an aircraft crash several
miles away from recovering.88 In addition, "close calls" would include
the scenario of a mother who, looking out an airport terminal window,
viewed her daughter's aircraft burst into flames on the ramp, several
hundred feet away. 89
C. The "'Foreseeable Plaintiff" Doctrine 90
Some jurisdictions, most notably California, adopted the Foreseeable
Plaintiff doctrine, which is a flexible proximate cause approach to by-
stander negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.91 In Dillon v.
84. Mr. Philip Corboy, a prominent plaintiffs' attorney, asserts this view. Telephone Interview
with Philip Corboy, Corboy & DeMitrio, Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Corboy Tele-
phone Interview].
85. Id.
86. Id
87. See Rickey, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
88. Id. "This rule does not require that the bystander suffer a physical impact or injury at the
time of the negligent act, but it does require that he must have been in such proximity to the accident
in which the direct victim was physically injured that there was a high risk to him of physical
impact." Id.
89. Id.
90. See Comment, supra note 3, at 803 (using the term "Foreseeable Plaintiff").
91. Id.
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Legg,92 the genesis of the doctrine, the California Supreme Court held
that the viability of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim turns
on the defendant's foreseeability of emotional injury to the plaintiff.93
According to the Dillon court, foreseeability is measured by three fac-
tors: (1) the plaintiff's distance from the incident; (2) whether the plain-
tiff actually witnessed the incident, or whether he learned of it second-
hand; and (3) the closeness of the relationship between the plaintiff and
the victim.94 Some jurisdictions additionally apply a physical manifesta-
tion requirement to the rule.95
Most importantly, the Foreseeable Plaintiff doctrine contains no arbi-
trary limitations, such as the impact requirement, and enthusiasticly en-
dorses the proximate cause theory. 96 In essence, the doctrine states that
courts may address negligent infliction of emotional distress actions with
the same rules that control "traditional" negligence actions: the existence
of a duty; a breach thereof; and proximate injury to the plaintiff.97
Although the Foreseeable Plaintiff doctrine is more flexible than the
Zone of Danger test, it is criticized as too open-ended.9 It presents the
potential for almost boundless applications of proximate cause and fore-
seeability. 99 Even the Supreme Court of California has criticized the re-
sults of its own rule,"°° and consequently limited it to ensure that courts
do not extend proximate cause notions beyond reasonable limits."°'
92. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
93. Id. at 919-20.
94. Id. at 920. For a list of jurisdictions following Dillon, see Comment, supra note 3, at 806
n. 139. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965) (creating liability where defendant
negligently and foreseeably put plaintiff in fear of physical injury).
95. Comment, supra note 3, at 808 & n.146.
96. See Comment, supra note 3, at 804 (discussing Dillon's distinction between the Zone of
Danger and Foreseeable Plaintiff rules).
97. Id. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
98. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828-29 (Cal. 1989).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 829-30. In Thing, the court held that a bystander can recover only when he: (1)
shares a close personal relationship with the direct victim; (2) cognizantly witnesses harm to the
direct victim from a near distance; and (3) incurs "serious emotional distress." Id. The second
element of the court's test, close proximity, appears to reinstate the Zone of Danger rule. Unlike
Zone of Danger test, the bystander need not fear bodily harm to himself or to the direct victim.
1992]
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1. Pre-Impact Fear
Air crash cases often also involve "pre-impact fear" claims,102 a child
of the parent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Pre-impact
fear claims seek compensation for the fear a victim experiences prior to
his sudden death. "3 The question is whether the victim's survivor in
interest can sue for mental anguish experienced prior to impact. In cases
where the victim dies immediately upon impact, pre-impact fear is the
only path to pain and suffering damages. 104
Courts approach the pre-impact fear issue in two ways. The "Ordeal"
approach10 5 contemplates liability for a defendant's negligence over the
entire time period surrounding the incident, and is thus not severable
into pre-impact and post-impact phases. 106 In contrast, courts that fol-
low the "Emotional Distress" approach 7 hold that pre-impact fear is a
species of negligent infliction of emotional distress, and must therefore
remain separate from post-impact claims.10 8
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979,109 the
plaintiff brought a survivorship action after her daughter died in an air-
102. Thomas D. Sydnor, II, Note, Damages for a Decedent's Pre-Impact Fear: An Element of
Damages Under Alaska's Survivorship Statute, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 351, 355 (1990).
103. Id. at 351. One commentator explains typical pre-impact fear claims:
The aircraft cases typically involve some sort of mechanical failure that causes an aircraft
to crash. At some point in time, the flight pattern of the aircraft or a warning from the
pilot informs the passengers that a crash is imminent. Thus, a passenger may become
aware that he or she may be killed. Even though a passenger may be killed instantly once
the actual impact occurs, the passenger may have suffered extreme mental anguish prior to
impact due to the knowledge of impending death.
Id.
104. Juries can award substantial amounts. One court sustained a jury award of $15,000 for
damages from four to six seconds of pre-impact fear. Haley v. Pan Am. Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 317-
18 (5th Cir. 1984). For a list of pre-impact awards, see Sydnor, supra note 102, at 354 n.8.
105. See Sydnor, supra note 102, at 356 (using the "Ordeal" approach).
106. Id. at 355-56. See, e.g., Haley, 746 F.2d at 314 ("We are not prepared to conclude that the
Louisiana courts would sever such an 'ordeal' into before and after impact components."); Shu-Tao
Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We see no intrinsic or logical
barrier to recovery for the fear experienced during a period in which the decedent is uninjured but
aware of an impending death."). For a general discussion of the "Ordeal" theory and accompanying
cases, see Sydnor, supra note 102, at 356-59.
107. See Sydnor, supra note 102, at 356, 359 (using the term "Emotional Distress").
108. Id. at 356. See also Nye v. Commonwealth, 480 A.2d 318, 322 (Pa. 1984) ("[TIhe estate
may recover damages for 'pre-impact fright' only upon proof that [the decedent] suffered physical
harm prior to the impact as a result of her fear of impending death."). For a general discussion of the
"Emotional Distress" approach, see Sydnor, supra note 102, at 359-62.
109. 507 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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plane crash.1"' The plaintiff sought damages for the emotional distress
that her daughter suffered prior to impact with the ground.I"' Applying
Illinois law, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held that survivors in interest may not recover pre-impact fear
damages." 2 Concluding that the victim's physical injury must coincide
with her fear, the court refused to allow the plaintiff to recover pre-im-
pact damages because the victim's physical injury occurred after her
fear. ' 1 3
The court's rationale in Chicago Air Crash squares with the "Emo-
tional Distress" theory on pre-impact fear because it asserts a cause of
action separate from post-impact claims. Thus, the cases turn upon the
negligent infliction of emotional distress rules applied. 1 4 As Chicago Air
Crash illustrates, the Physical Impact rule precludes pre-impact fear re-
covery." 5 If applied to direct victim cases, the traditional Zone of Dan-
ger test would likewise deny pre-impact claims because the third
requirement of the test-that fear cause physical manifestations
thereof-cannot be met except in the rarest of circumstances. 1 6 With-
out the physical manifestation requirement, the Zone of Danger test
would permit pre-impact recovery.' 17
110. Id. at 22.
111. Id. at 22-23.
112. Id. at 23.
113. Id. "Since, under Illinois law, an individual can recover for emotional distress or suffering
only when the distress is caused by a physical injury, plaintiff cannot recover for the fright and terror
her daughter may have experienced in anticipation of physical injury." Id
114. Interestingly, the "Ordeal" theory would reach the opposite conclusion. In totality, the
defendant's negligence causes all injury to a plaintiff emanating from the negligent act. Conse-
quently, a victim's pre-impact fear comprises part of the entire "ordeal" and therefore falls into the
realm of compensable damages. See Sydnor, supra note 102, at 358.
115. Sydnor, supra note 102, at 361.
116. The physical manifestation requirement is "very nearly a total bar to recovery of damages
for pre-impact fear." Sydnor, supra note 102, at 361. Plaintiffs would have extreme difficulty show-
ing fear-induced physical manifestations of a deceased, especially where, as in many air crash cases,
the victim's body suffers tremendous damage. Evidence that the victim vomited or exhibited some
other manifestation will probably not qualify as a "physical manifestation." However, the physical
manifestation requirement does not completely preclude recovery. For example, a victim may suffer
a heart attack after he learns of aircraft trouble but before impact. Because the heart attack resulted
from his fear of the impending impact, this victim, or his estate, could recover for pre-impact fear.
In reality, however, plaintiffs may have trouble proving that the fear of crashing-and not the crash
itself--caused the victim's heart to stop, especially where no witnesses survive.
117. Absent a physical manifestation requirement, the Zone of Danger test would allow recovery
in air crash cases because it is almost undisputable that a passenger aboard an aircraft bound for an
emergency landing: (1) fears for his life; and (2) is in the zone of danger.
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III. CORGAN V. MUEHLING AND THE "SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE" RULE
After adopting the Zone of Danger test in Rickey v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 118 Illinois courts struggled over whether to continue applying
the Zone of Danger test to direct victim cases." 9 In 1991, in Corgan v.
Muehling,12 ° the Supreme Court of Illinois determined the issue and
drastically changed Illinois law on the negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
In Corgan, the plaintiff alleged that her psychologist negligently main-
tained a sexual relationship with her, causing her severe mental pain. 121
The plaintiff did not assert a Zone of Danger theory, nor did she sepa-
rately allege physical manifestations of her trauma.1 22 The defendant ar-
gued that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because she did not meet the
Rickey Zone of Danger requirements.
1 23
In Corgan, the court held that Rickey's Zone of Danger test applies
only to bystander cases and does not govern direct victim actions.
1 24
Rather than adhere to the well settled Physical Impact rule,'21 the court
adopted a Simple Negligence rule for direct victim cases. The court held
that direct victims of negligent infliction of emotional distress state valid
causes of action when they plead negligence and accompanying liabil-
ity.1 26  In addition, the court noted that liability for negligence turns
118. 457 N.E.2d 1 (111. 1983). For a discussion of Rickey, see supra notes 76-83 and accompany-
ing text.
119. Allen v. Otis Elevator Co., 563 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (noting confusion on
the issue). Compare Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 480 N.E.2d 1227 (I11. App. Ct. 1985)
(applying the Zone of Danger test to bystander cases only) with Hammond v. Lane, 515 N.E.2d 828
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (applying the Zone of Danger rule to bystander and direct victim cases).
120. 574 N.E.2d 602 (ill. 1991).
121. Id at 603.
122. Id. at 604.
123. Id
124. Id. at 605. Mr. Philip Corboy asserted that the attorneys involved in the Corgan case
improperly emphasized Rickey's test because Rickey is totally inapplicable to direct victim actions.
Corboy Telephone Interview, supra note 84. In addition, he criticized the court for becoming dis-
tracted by the lawyers' Rickey arguments. Id.
125. In the period between Rickey and Corgan, Illinois appellate courts, which applied the Zone
of Danger test only to bystander cases, used the Physical Impact rule for direct victim cases. See,
e.g., Allen v. Otis Elevator Co., 563 N.E.2d 826, 830 (iI1. App. Ct. 1990) (explaining that Braun v.
Craven requires the court to apply the Physical Impact rule in direct victim cases); Siemieniec v.
Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 480 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (ill. App. Ct. 1985) (explaining Rickey's "limited
exception" for bystanders).
126. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 606. The court determined that the essential question was whether
the plaintiff asserted that the defendant was negligent. Id.
Other courts also adopted a version of the Simple Negligence rule prior to Corgan. See, e.g.,
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upon policy considerations, including the likelihood of harm, the magni-
tude of the harm, the defendant's burden in preventing the harm, and the
relationship between the parties. 127
The Corgan court abandoned the physical manifestation requirement
altogether,1 28 stating that jurors' ability to perceive insincere mental in-
jury claims and modem health care developments provide reliable checks
on emotional distress plaintiffs who cannot offer physically demonstrable
evidence of their fear.' 29 Unlike other jurisdictions, 3 ' the Illinois court
did not require the plaintiff to allege or prove severe emotional injury, as
opposed to any injury whatsoever. Thus, the court implicitly opened the
way for actual, albeit relatively trivial, negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims.1 '
The new Illinois rule for negligent infliction of emotional distress in
direct victim cases' 32 is simple: defendants are liable if they are negligent
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990) (ordinary negligence plus severe emo-
tional distress); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (same); and Bass v.
Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (adopting a simple negligence rule which includes a
physical manifestation requirement). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(2) (1965).
127. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 606.
128. Id. at 609 ("The emotional distress... is no less real than the distress that is coupled with
the physical manifestation... and should not be distinguishable at law.").
129. Id.
130. See Read, supra note 2, at 14. The Supreme Court of North Carolina established a rule
similar to Corgan's, but required severe emotional distress. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 395 S.E.2d
85, 97 (N.C. 1990). The court explained:
Where a defendant's negligent act has caused a plaintiff to suffer mere fright or temporary
anxiety not amounting to severe emotional distress, the plaintiff may not recover damages
for his fright and anxiety on a claim for infliction of emotional distress. Where, however,
such a plaintiff has established that he or she has suffered severe emotional distress as a
proximate result of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff need not allege or prove any
physical impact, physical injury, or physical manifestation of emotional distress ....
Id.
See also Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980); Bass v. Nooney, 646
S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983).
131. One justice concurred in judgment, and one justice dissented. Their opinions, however, do
not directly address the question of emotional distress as discussed in this Recent Development.
Rather, .the justices focused on the doctor-patient relationship. Concurring, Chief Justice Miller
stated that the defendant, a psychologist, was guilty of exploiting the plaintiff, not merely of being
negligent. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 611 (Miller, C.J., concurring). Thus, he suggested that the court
limit its holding to cases in which a health care professional exploits a patient. Id. Dissenting,
Justice Heiple asserted that the court should not hold the psychologist liable for malpractice because
the sexual relationship with the plaintiff did not constitute "treatment." Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
He suggested that a court should not allow one who willfully engages in sexual conduct to sue her
ex-lover when the relationship ends. Id.
132. The court's new rule only applies to direct victim cases; Rickey's Zone of Danger test still
governs bystander actions. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 605.
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and if an injury proximately results. Akin to the Foreseeable Plaintiff
test announced in California's Dillon v. Legg,133 the Simple Negligence
rule has no impact requirement, no zone of danger requirement, no phys-
ical manifestation requirement,13 4 and no apparent severe distress re-
quirement. 135 To prove simple negligence, a plaintiff need only show
that: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant
breached that duty; and (3) the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the
defendant's breach.136 Thus, the requirements for pleading negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress as a direct victim are identical to the ele-
ments of any other negligence action. 3 7 In Illinois, the Corgan decision
killed the long-settled distinction between direct victim negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress and traditional torts. 13 8
IV. CORGAN'S IMPACT ON AIR CRASH CASES
APPLYING ILLINOIS LAW
For several reasons, Corgan implies that plaintiffs' attorneys will gar-
ner negligent infliction of emotional distress damages in direct victim air
crash cases more easily.
First, Corgan may allow all direct victims to plead negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Because the Simple Negligence rule eliminates the
physical manifestation requirement of the Physical Impact rule, plaintiffs
claiming emotional distress from an aeronautical mishap need not show a
133. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Dillon. However, it is important to recall that Dillon applies to bystander cases, not direct victim
cases. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920. The Simple Negligence rule is also similar to the view asserted in
§ 436(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 436(2)
(1965).
134. Unlike the Simple Negligence rule, the Restatement requires physical manifestations. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 436(2), (3), 436A (1965).
135. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. The current Foreseeable Plaintiff doctrine
poses a severe distress requirement. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989).
136. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 606 (quoting Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 513
N.E.2d 387, 395-96 (111. 1987)).
137. See, e.g., Parsons v. Carbondale Township, 577 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (re-
stating the three basic negligence requirements: (1) existence of a duty; (2) defendant's breach of the
duty; and (3) plaintiff's injury proximately resulting from the breach). For a general discussion of
the basic negligence cause of action, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 164-68. See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
The only limitations placed upon the new rule exist in so-called policy considerations. Corgan,
574 N.E.2d at 606. In reality, these policy concerns do not impact negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims, especially those against air carriers. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text
for an analysis of the policy considerations' probable impact on claims.
138. Traditional torts include simple negligence and battery.
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physical sign of their fear. Although this may not yield a substantially
greater number of crash plaintiffs due to PTSD and other diagnosable
ailments, it may produce increased litigation in cases arising from minor
air accidents.
Second, airlines' status as common carriers139 gives plaintiffs a valua-
ble weapon in light of the new Simple Negligence rule. The law of negli-
gence holds common carriers to the "highest duty of care" vis-i-vis their
passengers. 140 Assuming that the enhanced duty applies to negligent in-
fliction claims, aviation plaintiffs will apparently have an especially easy
time garnering awards.
Third, Corgan's policy considerations limitations14' will not likely im-
pede plaintiffs' efforts. Of the four considerations the court men-
tioned,142 two factors, the gravity of harm and the relationship between
the parties, weigh heavily against airlines. Undoubtedly, the potential
physical and emotional harm arising from a major air crash constitutes
extremely grave harm. Although the likelihood of an air crash is very
low,143 the likelihood of emotional distress occurring before, during, and
after an air crash appears quite substantial. Moreover, the law requires
that airlines maintain the highest duty of care for their passengers. 144
Corgan's policy considerations may actually increase the probability that
a court will find an airline negligent.
Fourth, and most interesting, is Corgan's probable impact on pre-im-
pact fear claims. The Simple Negligence rule appears to permit pre-im-
pact fear claims. If this is true, plaintiffs can allege negligent infliction of
emotional distress even in the absence of a crash. For example, if an
airplane with three engines loses one in flight and the captain alerts his
passengers to the problem, many on board may fear for their lives. After
the captain safely lands the aircraft, passengers might scramble to the
nearest plaintiff's attorney, claiming negligent infliction of emotional dis-
139. Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Serv., 53 N.E.2d 131, 133-34 (I1. App. Ct. 1944); 2A C.J.S.
Aeronautics & Aerospace § 250 (1972 & Supp. 1991).
140. Skelton v. Chicago Transit Auth., 573 N.E.2d 1315, 1327 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Loring v.
Yellow Cab Co., 337 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 208-09.
141. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 606.
142. The considerations include: (1) likelihood of harm; (2) gravity of harm; (3) the burden on
the defendant to protect against the harm; and (4) the relationship between the parties. Corgan, 574
N.E.2d at 606. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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tress despite an absence of significant harm.145
To recover, plaintiffs need only show that: (1) the airline had a duty to
operate safely; (2) the airline breached that duty; and (3) the plaintiff
suffered some kind of emotional distress as a result. 147 Survivors can
easily meet these requirements. However, if the plane crashes and the
passenger dies, establishing a prima facie case can be more complicated
for survivorship plaintiffs. While pleading the existence of a duty and a
breach thereof is easily accomplished in air crash cases, demonstrating
injury is more difficult.' 48 While crash survivors can testify to their pre-
impact fear,'4 9 fatally injured passengers cannot. Survivorship plaintiffs'
attorneys, however, may be able to prove emotional distress in one of
three ways. First, an attorney can use the testimony of a passenger who
observed the victim and observed his fear. Second, an emergency worker
or coroner may note physical manifestations of fear, such as vomit. 150
Third, an attorney can employ a version of the res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine, ' asserting that the passenger must have known of the danger
present, and the passenger must have feared for his safety.152 Although
145. Such a situation appears consistent with Prosser and Keeton's "trivial" emotional distress.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 361.
146. Airlines operate under an enhanced duty of care. See supra notes 139-40 and accompany-
ing text.
147. See Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 606. Airlines should ensure that flight crews do not unnecessa-
rily alert passengers to aircraft problems. Where possible, airlines should stress that the problems do
not affect safe flight. These precautions reduce the chance that a court would find that passengers
"reasonably" feared bodily harm. Of course, such actions should be weighed against the need to
inform passengers so that they can prepare for an emergency landing.
148. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
149. Plaintiffs' attorney Philip Corboy has stated that asserting emotional distress damages in
survivor cases is very easy. The plaintiff simply alleges distress and testifies to it at trial. The only
problem facing a plaintiff is convincing a jury to award for the damages alleged. Corboy Telephone
Interview, supra note 84.
150. However, a plaintiff may have great difficulty proving that the passenger's physical manifes-
tations resulted from fear and not from bodily injury.
151. Literally translated, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." BLACK'S LAW
DIMCONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990). The doctrine aids plaintiffs who cannot directly prove that the
defendants caused the harm. To invoke res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff must usually show that: (1) the
incident causing harm does not normally arise without negligence; (2) the harm was caused by some-
thing over which the defendant had control; and (3) the plaintiff did not voluntarily contribute to the
incident which caused his injury. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 244.
Most importantly the res ipsa loquitur doctrine assumes proof of a thing which a plaintiff cannot
prove by conventional means. Thus, the doctrine operates as a gap-filler, assuming evidence that no
one can "prove."
152. The Fifth Circuit allowed a presumption of distress in Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777
(5th Cir. 1976). In Solomon, an aircraft crashed into the ocean. Id. at 792. The aircraft and its
passengers were never found and no evidence existed to suggest that the passengers actually knew of
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speculative,153 if the attorney overcomes pleading problems, the argu-
ment may succeed if submitted to a jury.1 54 However, even if juries are
typically sympathetic to plaintiffs, absent the testimony of a fellow pas-
senger or a physical manifestation of fear, a jury will never ascertain
whether the victim understood the aircraft problem and actually feared
impact.' 55
Although it is reasonable to assume that all passengers aboard an im-
paired aircraft may become hysterical, without evidence, a jury cannot
understand the thoughts of a particular passenger. 156 Thus, defense at-
torneys should argue that pre-impact fear claims are too speculative.-
57
Plaintiffs' attorneys, on the other hand, should assert that circumstantial
evidence, where available, establishes enough to invoke a jury ques-
tion. '58 For example, the cockpit voice recorder may show that the pilot
alerted his passengers to a problem and asked the ffight attendants to
prepare the cabin for an emergency landing. 15 9 Without any direct or
an impending crash or feared for their lives. Id. at 792. Despite the absence of evidence, the court
sustained the jury's pain and suffering award for pre-impact fear. Id. at 792-93. See also Haley v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1984) (inferring emotional distress without
direct evidence of fear). However, the arguments for fear presumption/inference were unclear in the
both Solomon and Haley.
153. See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1300-01 (D. Conn. 1974) (de-
nying recovery for pain and suffering because the evidence was too speculative).
154. In Solomon, the jury awarded $10,000 for the pre-impact fear of each of two passengers,
evidencing jury sympathy toward plaintiffs. 540 F.2d at 793.
155. Stating this concern, the Second Circuit refused to allow pre-impact fear damages in
Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 727 F.2d 202, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1984). In Shatkin, an airline
passenger died after the aircraft lost an engine on takeoff and, consequently, crashed. Id. at 204.
Denying pre-impact recovery, the court stated: "[lt must first be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the decedent had some knowledge or other basis for anticipating the impending disas-
ter. . . at least some circumstantial evidence must be adduced from which it can reasonably be
inferred that the passenger underwent some suffering before the impact." Id. at 206. The court
concluded that it could not reasonably infer that the passenger knew of the engine failure. Id.
Further, the court found no evidence that the passenger feared impact during the short period be-
tween the time the airplane entered a steep bank and the time it crashed. Id. at 207. See also
Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1301 (D. Conn. 1974) (pre-impact claim
"too speculative"); Nye v. Commonwealth, 480 A.2d 318, 321 (Pa. 1984) (denying recovery because
no evidence existed that the auto passenger was conscious before or during impact).
156. Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1984).
157. See supra note 153.
158. See supra note 148.
159. In Solomon, for example, recorded communications between Air Traffic Control ("ATC")
and the pilot showed that the pilot knew he had to land his aircraft in the ocean. 540 F.2d at 782 &
n.5, 792-93. The court believed that this evidence supported an inference of the passengers' pre-
impact fear. Id. at 792-93.
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circumstantial evidence, 1" plaintiffs' attorneys should assert the modi-
fied res ipsa loquitur argument and cross their fingers.
Finally, Corgan may increase the damages claimed in serious air crash
cases because the court abrogated the physical manifestation requirement
and refused to require allegations of severe emotional harm. Two types
of plaintiffs, those with relatively trivial claims, and those with feigned or
imaginary claims, may benefit from the decision. 6 Plaintiffs' lawyers
have no difficulty establishing "subjective" pain, such as headaches. 62
Moreover, alleging severe emotional distress in an air crash case seems
simple. Although many crash victims surely suffer severe distress, a
threshold fear requirement may prevent a number of trivial or minor
claims.
Apparently, reinstatement of the physical manifestation requirement is
unlikely in Illinois, because Corgan clearly held that other mechanisms
ensure reliability of the claim. 163 However, because the court never ad-
dressed the issue, Corgan's failure to specify a severe distress requirement
does not necessarily establish that one does not exist. Defense attorneys
should argue that Corgan does not contemplate recovery for trivial
claims because the law is well settled that policy considerations preclude
such actions."' Perhaps more importantly, other jurisdictions that ap-
ply a version of the Simple Negligence rule to direct victim cases restrict
the rule to cases involving severe distress.1 6 A similar construction
160. A complete lack of evidence may arise where, for example, an aircraft "disappears," or
where all aboard die and authorities cannot recover recorded information. However, a complete
lack of evidence apparently is a relatively rare occurrence, especially for commercial air carriers.
Even where all evidence aboard an aircraft is destroyed, recorded communications between the cock-
pit crew and ATC provide at least some relevant information. See, e.g., Solomon, 540 F.2d at 792-
93.
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note
1, at 361.
162. Corboy Telephone Interview, supra note 84.
163. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 609 (explaining that advancements in mental health care provide
more accurate evidence of genuine emotional distress).
164. See Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657, 664 (Ill. 1898); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at
359-61; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965).
165. California is the most persuasive jurisdiction to assert such a position, advancing plaintiffs'
rights well before its neighbors. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (1968), discussed at supra notes
94-97 and accompanying text. In Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., the Supreme Court of California
held that a plaintiff may allege a cause of action for "the negligent infliction of serious emotional
distress actions." 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (emphasis added). Moreover, in Thing v. La Chusa,
the California court limited negligent infliction of emotional distress actions to plaintiffs who demon-
strate "serious emotional distress." 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989). Although Thing was a by-
stander case, the court's restrictions indicate a desire to taper the scope of negligent defendants'
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could hinder potential plaintiffs from establishing prima facie claims.
Absent such a limitation, the Corgan court has apparently thrown open
the door to recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress in air
crash cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the Simple Negligence rule announced in Corgan, several types
of air crash plaintiffs may potentially recover negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress damages: (1) all surviving passengers alleging that they
were aware of an impending emergency landing and feared for their
safety, whether or not they sustained physical manifestations of fear; (2)
the survivors in interest of passengers killed in a crash, when direct evi-
dence of the passenger's pre-impact fear exists, and possibly when cir-
cumstantial evidence supports fear; and (3) bystanders in the zone of
danger 1 who allege fear for personal safety, and prove physical manifes-
tations of fear. Illinois law seems to preclude claims by bystanders not in
the zone of danger, and by bystanders who fail to show physical manifes-
tations of their fear, including all plaintiffs who learn of a crash second-
hand.
Whether Illinois courts facing the issue in the future will restrict Cor-
gan's Simple Negligence rule remains unclear. Perhaps a major air crash
will induce a relative flood of new negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims, prompting courts to place a restricting device, such as a
severe distress requirement, on the seemingly open-ended Simple Negli-
gence rule.167 Only time will determine if the court in Corgan extended
the rule too far.
Eric A. Cunningham, III
liability. Id. at 815. The court concluded that: "[Clear judicial days [exist] on which a court can
foresee forever and thus determine liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a socially
and judicially acceptable limit on recovery of damages for that injury." Id. at 830.
Similar to California, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has restricted direct victim recovery
to plaintiffs who successfully prove "severe emotional distress." Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 395
S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990). For an in-depth discussion of Johnson, see Tracy L. Hamrick, A Clear
Judicial Day in North Carolina-Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics Smooths the Way for Plaintiffs'
Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1714 (1991).
166. The zone of danger in air crash cases is quite expansive, especially where the aircraft ap-
pears to be out of control or where the crash causes a large explosion.
167. "The pending litigation arising out of the air crash disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, in July of
1987, may provide opportunities for both the Illinois appellate courts and the Seventh Circuit to
interpret Corgan." Walker Interview, supra note 11.
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